Monday, 14 October 2013

A report on the colloquium

Syria
A Staff-Student Colloquium

Final Report



Introduction
The staff-student colloquium on Syria took place a little over a week ago now and first of all we would like to thank all those who attended and took part on 4th October, and who helped to make it a fascinating and enjoyable event. Particular thanks go to our six speakers, whose heterogeneous and provocative presentations we have summarised in the report below.

The colloquium was opened by Dr. Alan Renwick (pictured below), the Director of Postgraduate Research Studies in Politics.



Welcoming more than forty audience members to a packed room in the University’s Palmer Building, Dr. Renwick noted that discussing the situation in Syria is of paramount importance for a Department of Politics and International Relations, since aspects of the conflict touch upon almost all of our research interests in one way or another. In relation to his own interests in British parliamentary politics and reform, Dr. Renwick pointed out that the Commons vote on intervention in Syria was an example of parliament ‘asserting itself in foreign policy’ in a way not seen since the Second World War. These opening remarks helped to set the tone for what was to become a lively and informative debate.

Panel One
The first panel of the colloquium opened with Dr. Andreas Behnke speaking on ‘the political construction of the chemical weapons taboo’. 


Dr. Behnke began with the observation that the general prohibition on chemical weapons was established by the late nineteenth century, even before these weapons were created. Concerns over the possible use of such weapons drew upon much older conceptions of poisoning as a dishonourable and unfair way of killing. In particular, concerns coalesced around the potential for the use of chemical weapons against civilians.

At the core of these ideas and norms about chemical weapons, Dr. Behnke argued, lies the politics of ‘civilisational standards’. On the one hand, this has meant pronouncing upon the users of such weapons in large-scale conventional wars (e.g. Germany in the First World War) as ‘uncivilised’, while on the other hand it has enabled the self-proclaimed ‘civilised’ world to freely use such weapons against ‘barbaric’ peoples elsewhere.

Civilisational standards come into play in the international response to the use of chemical weapons in Syria inasmuch as it is emphasised that while it is acceptable for ‘civilised’ Western states to possess such weapons, and indeed ‘weapons of mass destruction’ (WMD), they must not fall into the ‘wrong hands’ (i.e. the hands of ‘rogue states’ and ‘terrorists’). However, chemical weapons attacks account for less than 1% of the casualties in the Syrian civil war to date, and the exclusive focus on their use has distracted media attention from the fact that the Assad regime has actually been taking an even harder line on the rebel forces in recent months.

Our second speaker, Dr. Christina Hellmich, went on to look at how the Syrian conflict affects, and is affected by, regional dynamics. 


Dr. Hellmich emphasised especially that, contrary to certain media depictions in the West, this is not a ‘two-sided’ war in which a group of rebels seek to overthrow a government. There are, rather, a whole set of complex conflicts, including proxy wars between neighbouring Middle Eastern states, being played out in Syria today.

In a wide-ranging talk, Dr. Hellmich discussed the motivations of a range of regional powers, from Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Iran to Russia, Turkey and Israel, in their involvement with the conflict in Syria. These motivations are rooted in sectarian, religious and political contests and conflicts, as well as economic goals. These divisions and disputes inform the support by regional neighbours for particular rebel groups as well as for the Assad regime, and consequently any post-war outcome is likely to entail a fragmented Syria.

The third and final speaker on our first panel, Dr. Burak Kadercan, opened his talk with an explanation of his title, ‘The Dukes of Hazard’. 


Riffing on the title of the early-1980s American TV show (and 2005 film of the same name), ‘The Dukes of Hazzard’, which revolved around the adventures of the stock-car racing, risk-taking Duke brothers in the fictional county of Hazzard, Georgia, Dr. Kadercan took us through some of the dangers and problems involved in foreign interference in the Syrian civil war.

Specifically, Dr. Kadercan proposed using the economic theory of ‘moral hazard’ to think about such interference. Foreign powers engaged in a form of ‘insurance politics’ through their backing of various parties in the conflict may actually produce unintended incentives that will make the war longer and nastier.

Taking the role of Turkey as a case in point, Dr. Kadercan argued that Turkish support for some insurgent groups and the existence of ‘part-time’ fighters who are allowed to cross the border into Syria to fight during the day, while safely returning to their beds in Turkey at night, are precisely indicators of how little incentive there currently is to bring the conflict to a close. In seeking to insure themselves against possible futures in Syria, neighbouring powers like Turkey actually exacerbate and prolong the violent conflict there.

The first panel was followed by a flurry of questions and comments from the audience, with some consensus emerging around several key points, perhaps most importantly, that whatever happens in Syria now will not stay in Syria. The nature of the region is such that the outcome of this conflict will be far-reaching.

Panel Two
Corinne Heaven opened our second panel of the afternoon with a paper on the role of the United Nations with regard to establishing the ‘truth’ around chemical weapons use in Syria. 


Following up on her recent blog post on the topic, Corinne focused on how the power of truth-telling with regard to armed conflict is increasingly vested in ‘scientific’ branches of the United Nations bureaucracy.

The ostensible importance of ascertaining ‘scientifically’ who used chemical weapons against whom, of establishing the ‘scientific truth’, has led to certain bodies obtaining new and important powers. Specifically, the United Nations – not in the wider sense of the group of states bound together by treaty, but in the narrower sense of the UN as a relatively independent bureaucratic institution – has attained the status of arbiter in the determination of ‘truth’ about war. Thus, while much reporting on Syria has focused on the plural sources of knowledge of the conflict (YouTube, Twitter etc.), there is in fact a concerted effort to privilege a particular category of knowledge – the scientific – in political decision-making.

The second speaker on Panel Two, Professor Dominik Zaum, analysed the role and status of the UN Security Council (SC) in relation to the Syrian conflict.


Professor Zaum initially noted the widely held view that the SC is ‘paralysed’ by disagreements between the permanent five members (P5). With regard to Syria, he pointed out, a third veto from Russia and China in July 2012 led the US and UK to accuse the former of preventing the SC from doing its job, while the General Assembly also expressed dismay at the SC’s stalemate on Syria. By early September, a US-led intervention without SC-backing seemed all but inevitable.

However, the sudden passing of a resolution on Syria in late September, together with a joint statement from the SC on the matter, seems to imply that the ‘great powers’ feel the need to find legitimacy through the SC rather than acting independently.

More interesting than the outcome, Professor Zaum observed, is the decision-making process in this case, and the surprising twists and turns the processes of legitimacy can take. For example, whereas the ‘problem states’ were initially seen to be China and Russia, using their veto irresponsibly, in the course of the process, the ‘problem states’ became France and the UK, who were pushing for a military solution when the US and China were able to negotiate a diplomatic one. Indeed, much of the difficulty faced by national governments in obtaining domestic support for intervention (as in the House of Commons vote) lies in the lack of perceived legitimacy in military action not sanctioned by the SC.

Our final speaker of the day was Dr. Patrick Porter, whose lively and cautionary commentary focused on the dangers associated with a casual attitude towards military intervention in the West today.


Dr. Porter began by noting that the international response to the civil war and chemical weapons controversy in Syria has largely been about what ‘the West’ thinks it is, and what it thinks it is in charge of doing. Specifically, the liberal notion that war is an instrument of justice was central to the debates around intervention.

This assumption has been a key flaw in much of the Western discourse on Syria. It has included an assumption that when Western states intervene, they are somehow not a source of chaos, and act in a neutral fashion. To intervene in the ways proposed by the US in August and early September would have meant taking a side in a civil war. Furthermore, Dr. Porter argued, Obama’s statements on the conflict and proposed intervention were permeated not only by the ‘just war’ doctrine, but by a recession-era ‘cheapness’ – the notion that we must involve ourselves in a conflict in a way that is at once morally good and financially restrictive. This seems to be a disastrous approach, and one that Dr. Porter argued ardently against.

The final round of discussion for the day picked up on themes raised in the three papers on Panel Two, especially on questions of domestic and international legitimacy, as well as the foolhardiness of rushing into armed conflict.

The colloquium drew to a close with a drinks reception, where staff and students continued to discuss and debate the issues raised during the afternoon.


Many thanks, once again, to all those who helped to make this event happen – to our six wonderful speakers, to Dr. Renwick for his opening remarks, to Professor Beatrice Heuser for allowing us to integrate this event into the postgraduate induction programme and for use of the room, and to Professor Alan Cromartie, the Head of Department for Politics and International Relations, whose generous support allowed this event to take place. We are also grateful to Mary Boitz, Melva Jeffries, Caroline Walter and Jen Scheppers for their organisational support and advice.

We hope that you all found the colloquium as enjoyable and interesting as we did. This colloquium was organised by postgraduate research students in the Department of Politics and International Relations, pictured below (from L-R: Malte Riemann, Norma Rossi, Nadya Ali, Ben Whitham, Corinne Heaven).


Friday, 4 October 2013

Syria colloquium - Today!

Just to remind all attendees that the colloquium begins today at 3:00pm in the Palmer Building, room 104, with tea, coffee and some opening remarks from our Director of Postgraduate Research Studies in Politics, Dr. Alan Renwick. A final programme for the colloquium is below (click to enlarge). We look forward to seeing you all there!

Monday, 30 September 2013

Chemical weapons outrage?

In advance of this Friday's colloquium: the civil war in Syria, Oatmeal style (click to view)

To access the poster (including the full programme) for the colloquium, please click the link on the right-hand side of the page, or scroll down to find it in an earlier post.

Friday, 27 September 2013

The Duke of Hazard? Colloquium speaker writes on Turkish foreign policy, Syria and 'moral hazard'

With just a week to go until the colloquium, one of our speakers, Dr. Burak Kadercan, has written a piece for openDemocracy on Turkey's Middle East foreign policy, with a particular focus on the 'moral hazard' involved in Ankara's position on Syria and dealings with rebel groups there. Check out his article here.

Monday, 23 September 2013

Truth dies first?

With less than two weeks to go until the colloquium, events in and around Syria remain fast-changing and unpredictable. However, in what has very often been referred to as a 'media war', it is perhaps unsurprising that footage uploaded to YouTube last week purporting to show Liwa al-Islam rebels in Syria launching the very chemical attack that became the basis for threats of a US-led military intervention has come in for considerable scrutiny and criticism.

The fact that the barrel of the 'rebel' artillery weapon depicted in the video is helpfully draped in an identifying flag, while the rebels themselves continuously, if rather dispassionately, repeat 'Allahu Akbar' throughout the proceedings has led to speculation that this video was created by government forces, or perhaps even a rival rebel group.

In an era where wars are played out, at least on the international stage, through YouTube, Twitter, blogs and news media, the old adage (of disputed origin) that 'truth' is the first casualty of war seems more relevant than ever. Both the Assad regime and the rebel groups are undoubtedly seeking to not only shape the representations of the conflict that appear through major international news outlets, but also to produce their own propaganda, illustrated with photos and videos, for direct dissemination via YouTube and blogs.

Though military intervention in Syria perhaps looks increasingly unlikely, the justificatory resources upon which the Obama administration drew in making the case for an attack were premised wholly and exclusively upon the perceived veracity of one version of events; the 'truth' that the Assad regime used chemical weapons against rebels and civilians in Damascus.

But who decides on the 'true' version of events, and on what sort of basis? In whose interests does any particular 'truth' work best? In a world where propaganda wars have moved on from pamphleteering - where there is now the potential for even the smallest of groups to produce and quickly (and globally) disseminate relatively sophisticated multimedia products - how are we to judge or think about the 'evidence' which is presented as the basis for possible military action? What problems arise when film becomes a form of evidence of war crimes, and how far do cinematic themes of narrative, framing and characterisation figure in the production and interpretation of video 'evidence'? Are all representations of events in war 'staged' in some sense? And, given the special difficulties associated with establishing a reliable version of events during armed conflict, can we trust that the 'chemical attack' is the 'real' basis for proposed action at all? If not, what other factors have been behind Obama's push for intervention?

These are just some of the questions we hope to address when we meet next Friday, 4th October, and we hope that you will be able to join us!

Wednesday, 18 September 2013

Attending the colloquium? Let us know you're coming in 3 clicks!

If you plan to attend the colloquium, please let us know by clicking here and answering 'yes' to our survey. This will help with ensuring we have adequate space and refreshments on the day.

Colloquium speaker writes on Syria for Global Policy

Ahead of the colloquium, one of our speakers, Corinne Heaven, has written a piece on the Syrian conflict and role(s) of UN inspection teams, for Global Policy. You can read her post here.